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This article argues for reconfiguring the study of identity formation 
through the concept of narrative. It is motivated by two recent but 
seemingly unrelated developments in social theory and society. One is 
the emergence of a wide-spread "identity politics" and a concomitant 
scholarly focus on the "social construction of identity." The other is the 
reconfigured approach to the concept of narrative that researchers 
from many disciplines have been formulating in recent years. Both are 
important developments not to be overlooked by social scientigts and 
social theorists; both, however, have problems and limitations as they 
now stand. I argue in this article that the limitations of each potentially 
can be overcome by bringing the two thematics together. The key con- 
cept I propose to achieve this reconfiguration is that of narrative identity. 
Studies of identity formation have made major contributions to our 
understanding of social agency. A recurring problem, however, has 
been a perhaps inadvertent tendency to conflate identities with what 
can often slide into fixed "essentialist" (pre-political) singular categories, 
such as those of race, sex, or gender - a direction that has characterized 
a number of feminist theories in their efforts to restore the previously 
marginalized female other. 1 Anthropological studies of different cul- 
tures have been been used to avoid this danger. 2 But, law professor 
Patricia Williams reminds us that we do not have to resort to cultural 
others to recognize the false certainties imposed by categorical ap- 
proaches to identity: 
While being black has been the powerful social attribution in my life, it is only 
one of a number of governing narratives or presiding fictions by which I am 
constantly reconfiguring myself in the world. Gender is another, along with 
ecology, pacifism, my peculiar brand of colloquial English, and Roxbury, 
Massachusetts. The complexity of role identification, the politics of sexuality, 
the inflections of professionalized discourse - all describe and impose 
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boundary in my life, even as they confound one another in unfolding spirals 
of confrontation, deflection, and dream....3 
One way to avoid the hazards of rigidifying aspects of identity into a 
misleading categorical entity is tO incorporate into the core conception 
of identity the categorically destabilizing dimensions of time, space, 
and relationality. We can do this by bringing to the study of identity for- 
mation the epistemological and ontological challenges of relational and 
network analysis. It is this effort to historicize our understanding of 
identity that motivates my attempt to combine studies of identity with a 
conceptual narrativity. 
The study of narrative, on the face of it, has its own serious limitations. 
Most prominently, narrative analysis is not something easily assimilated 
into the social-science research agenda. With its long association with 
the humanities and the "story-telling" methods of historians, the con- 
cept of narrative, after all, has long fulfilled the role of social science's 
"epistemological other" - a mode of representation that was, apparent- 
ly, discursive, rather than quantitative; non-explanatory, rather than 
conditionally propositional; and non-theoretical, rather than one of the 
theoretically-driven social sciences. 4 In the 1960s and 1970s, however, 
social science history had emerged as a serious contender to the tradi- 
tional historians' narrative approach and these decades were notable 
for the degree to which historians debated and increasingly scorned the 
value of narrative as a representational form. s At the same time, how- 
ever, disciplines other than history (political philosophers, psycholo- 
gists, legal theorists, feminist theorists, social workers, organizational 
theorists, anthropologists, and medical sociologists) were quietly 
appropriating and reconceptualizing the narrative concept. 6 In so 
doing, they were reconfiguring in radical ways the narrative concept. 
While the older interpretation of narrative was limited to that of a 
representational form, the new approaches define narrative and narra- 
tivity as concepts of social epistemology and social ontology. These con- 
cepts posit that it is through narrativity that we come to know, under- 
stand, and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives 
and narrativity that we constitute our social identities. They argue that 
it matters not whether we are social scientists or subjects of historical 
research, but that all of us come to be who we are (however ephemeral, 
multiple, and changing) by being located or locating ourselves (usually 
unconsciously) in social narratives rarely of our own making] Social 
theorists and sociologists need to become cognizant of these new for- 
mulations of narrative analysis. 
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The attraction of linking the study of identity formation to narrative 
analysis should now be clearer. Engaging with this aspect of narrative 
studies clearly should be on the 'agenda for sociological studies of 
action and agency. After all, if research results are correct, then every- 
thing we know, from making families, to coping with illness, to carrying 
out strikes and revolutions is at least in part a result of numerous cross- 
cutting relational story-lines in which social actors find or locate them- 
selves. 8 By focusing attention on the new ontological dimension of 
narrative studies rather than on the traditional rendering of narrative as 
limited to a method or form of representation, we have the opportunity 
to engage with historically and empirically based research into social 
action and social agency that is at once temporal, relational, and cul- 
tural, as well as institutional, material, and macro-structural. An ener- 
getic engagement with this new ontological narrativity provides an 
opportunity to infuse the study of identity formation with a relational 
and historical approach that avoids categorical rigidities by emphasiz- 
ing the embeddedness of identity in overlapping networks of relations 
that shift over time and space. My larger hope is that bringing together 
narrative and identity can bring a new perspective to some of the seem- 
ingly intractable problems contained in social theories of action. In the 
next section, I explore the new sociology and politics of identity; in the 
succeeding section, I discuss in more detail the reframed concept of 
narrative; in the third section, I position the concepts of narrative iden- 
tity and relational setting as conceptual links between the reframed 
approach to narrative and some of the enduring conundrums in the 
sociology of action; and I end by considering some of the research 
implications of a conceptual narrativity. 
The politics of identity: From universality to category 
In recent years, social theory has been confronted with a set of extra- 
ordinary challenges - ones that have arisen in part from external po- 
litical and social transformations and in part from theoretical attempts 
to make sense of those social developments. The political and social 
elements are best represented by such factors as the "failure" of west- 
ern working classes to carry out their "proper" revolutionary (class) 
interests, the collapse of communist regimes, the radical increase of 
women in the work force, and the conflicts of ethnic solidarities and 
cultural nationalisms throughout the world. Among the responses to 
these changes are the vast array of "new social movements" that have 
risen to prominence in the last twenty years (Green parties, gay and 
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lesbian liberation movements, and so on), the explosion of a feminist 
consciousness that valorizes difference as much as equality, and the 
politics of multiculturalism. 9 
Although they take no universal form, the various expressions of this 
new "politics of identity" all share the common feature of being consti- 
tuted by people who previously felt marginalized from dominant politi- 
cal channels and more mainstream social movements. 1° Significantly, 
these are also groups and individuals who have been marginalized by 
prevailing social theoretical accounts for why people act the way they 
do. Thus, for example, classical theoretical accounts of social movement 
organizations focus on class interests as a motivating factor for action or 
"instrumental" calculi to achieve specifically power-oriented goals. But 
rather than emphasize traditional issues of labor and production, the 
new politics and movements of identity stress "expressive" goals of "self- 
realization ''1~ while they attempt positively to restore previously de- 
valued differences (e.g., female care-taking and "being-in-relations"). 12 
To make sense of these striking developments, new theories of action 
and agency have emerged. These new theories of "identity-politics" 
have shifted explanations, for action from "interests" and "norms" to 
identities and solidarities, from the notion of the universal social agent 
to particularistic categories of concrete persons. Based on the assump- 
tion that persons in similar social categories and similar life-experi- 
ences (based on gender, color, generation, sexual orientation, and so 
on) will act on the grounds of common attributes, theories of identi.ty- 
politics posit that "I act because of who I am]' not because of a rational 
interest or set of learned values. 
The study of identity formation is relatively new on the agenda of social 
theory. When viewed in the context of the enduring conundrum of 
explaining social action, these new theories of identity are easily recog- 
nizable as confrontations with the intractable problems of agency that 
have long characterized the social sciences: How can we formulate 
viable sociological accounts of moral action that do not resort to exter- 
nal constraint (or "internalized" external constraint) to explain action 
that "deviates" from the universalist premises of mainstream theories? 
The solution that characterizes many of the new approaches to identity 
formation has been to challenge the putative universalism of the 
modernist ontology itself, for it is only when judged against this alleged 
norm that women and other others have been found wanting. The new 
theoretical perspectives have thus argued that the putative universal 
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social actor is in fact extremely particularistic - namely, white, male, 
and western. Most important, they claim that it is only in the context of 
this theoretical sleight of hand, one that claims universality for the par- 
ticnlaristic and androcentric, that the experiences of others are sup- 
pressed, denied, and devalued in the first place. Thus the theoretical 
response has been not only to reveal the gendered or racially- or class- 
specific character of the "general" modern social actor. It has also been 
to propose and envision a theoretical alternative that transforms those 
very devalued traits of (female or racial) otherness into a newly 
esteemed ideal of selfhood and normatized social action. 
Leading examples of such changes in feminist theory are the well- 
known works of Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan. 13 Gilligan began 
by confronting the fact that for years scholars of moral development 
had pondered the seemingly unanswerable question of why women did 
not achieve the highest stages of development allegedly achieved by 
men. Social scientists and psychologists alike kept asking: Why are 
women anomalous to the norm? More specifically, they wanted to 
know why women putatively were getting "stuck" at a "lower stage" of 
moral development, while men developed a sense of agency and 
judgment according to the theoretical social norm - that is, they be- 
come increasingly autonomous, individuated, and oriented to rules of 
abstract justice. Women, by contrast, were believed to be at a lower 
stage because they were found to have a sense of agency still tied pri- 
marily to their social relationships and to make political and moral 
decisions based on context-specific principles based on these relation- 
ships rather than on the grounds of their own autonomous judgments. 
Students of gender studies know well just how busy social scientists have 
been kept by their efforts to come up with ever more sociological "alibis" 
for the question of why women did not act like men. Gilligan's response 
was to refuse the terms of the debate altogether. She thus did not develop 
yet another explanation for why women are "deviant." Instead, she 
turned the question on its head by asking what was wrong with the theory 
- a theory whose central premises defines 50% of social beings as 
"abnormal." Gilligan translated this question into research by subjecting 
the abstraction of universal and discrete agency to comparative research 
into female behavior evaluated on its own terms The  new research re- 
vealed women to be more "concrete" in their thinking and more attuned 
to "fairness" while men acted on "abstract reasoning" and "rules of jus- 
tice." These research findings transformed female otherness into varia- 
tion and difference - but difference now freed from the normative de- 
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valuation previously accorded to it. In so doing, Gilligan contributed not 
only to a new recognition but to a theoretical and political celebration of 
the very female identity that prevailing theories had denigrated. 14 
Struggles over identity are thus being framed by the recognition that 
getting heard requires new theories. Other scholars engaged in identity- 
politics are also insisting that there are ways of knowing and defining 
experience different from but equally valuable as those rendered by the 
dominant theoretical discourses. Law professor Catherine MacKinnon, 
for instance, observes that it is difficult for women to stage a revolution 
using the tools of the oppressor - especially his "words. ''15 Here she 
sounds like cultural analyst Molefi Kete Asante, when he asks in a simi- 
lar vein: How can the oppressed use the same theories as the oppres- 
sors?16 In "The Search for an Afrocentric Method," Asante not only 
challenges assumptions about the universality of Eurocentric concepts; 
he also simultaneously restores dignity to the very qualities of other- 
ness by which such theories had previously defined and devalued these 
same non-western identities. 17 
These theoretical challenges have been pathbreaking. They move away 
from deriving the meaning of action and the definition of the self from 
falsely imputed.universalities and toward generating concrete notions 
of social being that begin from difference. This can only improve the 
prospects for theories of agency. At the same time, however, the vir- 
tually simultaneous outcries of "essentialism" directed towards these 
new identity-politics testify to a whole new set of stubborn conceptual 
difficulties that they contain. Among the many questions we must ask, 
for example, is whether the new theories of identity-politics are not 
creating their own new "totalizing fictions" in which a single category of 
experience, say gender, will over-determine any number of cross- 
cutting simultaneous differences such as race and class. Does this not 
run "roughshod" over women who might be "ill-served" by replacing all 
other forms of difference by the singular one of gender? 18 Feminists of 
color charge that feminist identity-theories focusing exclusively on 
gender oversimplify their situation, because gender is just one of a 
number of other fundamental facets of identity and difference, such as 
poverty, class, ethnicity, race, sexual identity, and age.  19 
Another question we must ask is how is it possible to claim these 
approaches to identity are truly arguing for a social construction of 
agency, given that they theorize identity from essential (that is, pre- 
political) or fixed categories constructed from given attributes - e.g., 
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woman, African-American. If identities are fixed there can be no room 
to accommodate changing power relations - or history itself - as they 
are constituted and reconstituted over time. One of the most influential 
of these criticisms has been that directed by Joan Scott against 
the work of Chodorow and Gilligan. 2° Scott pointed out that even 
with a well-deserved refutation of abstract universalism, Chodorow 
and Gilligan have only substituted their own ahistorical and essentialist 
notion of "woman. ''2~ Why, Scott continues to ask, should we assume 
that "women" will all act the same under all conditions simply because 
of their biological sex or even their socialized gender-identities? :2 
Does that not open up the possibility for a female version of abstract 
universal agency against which any number of historically different 
forms of female agency will be held newly "deviant?" 
There are also important questions about the allegedly stable content 
of the new categories of identity. To assume that simply because in 
some places and in some times women appear to be more morally rela- 
tional than men in their sense of agency does not in any way support 
the more general conclusion that all women are more morally relation- 
al than men. To be sure, there is abundant evidence that under certain 
conditions such a generalization could be supported. However, do we 
really want to accept that these dichotomous concepts of gender dis- 
tinction really reflect the social world? Is it not just as likely that the 
theoretical categories of exclusion helped constitute those gender dif- 
ferences in the first place? And if it is indeed the case that female iden- 
tities are the consequence of categories based on false universality and 
exclusions, should we not criticize and contest these categorical identi- 
ties? In short, even assuming the empirical case to be true, is it not a 
serious mistake to leap from the empirical presence of relational iden- 
titles to their normative valorization? There is too much evidence of 
the potentially suffocating and negative effects of "being-in-relations" 
to accept this move uncritically. 
The underlying argument here is that a gender-centered identity- 
politics does not take on the real challenge of criticizing, contesting, 
transforming, indeed escaping from the theoretical dichotomies that 
buttress and hierarchize forms of difference in the first place. In- 
stead, the new identity-theories reify anew what is in fact a multiplicity 
of historically varying form of what are less often unified and singular 
and more often "fractured identities. ''23 Thus although some scholars 
claim that establishing an identity or expressing self-realization is one 
of the goals of new social movements, 24 there are others who consider 
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the newly celebrated but fixed categories of identity and self-realization 
to be newly problematic, regardless of their being informed by the 
traits of the previously excluded, z5 
Finally, and perhaps most worrisome, we must question the slide from 
the gendered distinction between a moral and a normative notion of 
relationality (women are "relational," men are "autonomous") to a 
gendered distinction in the degree of analytic relationality between 
men and women. The latter is an impossible conclusion. To be sure, 
there is evidence to show that many men in some times and places are 
less morally oriented to relationships than are women; but this is a 
result of the social, historical, and relational constitution of male identi- 
fies in these times and places. That is, both men and women must be 
conceived analytically as being embedded within and constituted by 
relationships and relationality. Masculine individualism is itself the 
product of social relationality. Whether the analytic relationality char- 
acteristic of both men and women devolves into a universally gendered 
distinction in empirical or normative relationality must not be pre- 
sumed a priori but can only be explored empirically and historically. 
These are some of the theoretical ambushes contained in the new theo- 
ries of agency we call identity-politics. In the absence of clearly positive 
theoretical and epistemological alternatives to the problem of identity, 
however, such criticisms can have the effect of only tossing theories of 
social action and identity back and forth between the abstract (white 
male) universality of the modern individuating agent who starves in a 
vacuum of abstraction, and the essential "woman" (or black, or Serbian, 
or gay man) who drowns in a sea of relationality, "experience;' and iden- 
tity. A number of studies from different approaches have therefore 
begun the task of developing positive theoretical and epistemological 
alternatives to these two mutually reinforcing opposites. 26 Fraser and 
Nicholson articulate the challenge at hand in their suggestion that alter- 
native theories of agency - in this case feminist agency - must 
be inflicted by temporality, the historically-specific institutional categories 
like the modern, restricted, male-headed, nuclear family taking precedence 
over ahistorical functionalist categories like reproduction and mothering. 
Where categories of the latter sort were eschewed altogether, they would be 
genealogized, that is, framed by historical narrative and rendered temporally 
and culturally specific, z7 
Joining the many others who are struggling to give substance to this 
directive, I propose linking the concepts of narrative and identity to 
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generate a historically constituted approach to theories of social action, 
agency, and identity. 
Introducing narrativity 
I argue above that recent challenges to the long-dominant presup- 
positions of universal agency have the potential to reify their own cul- 
turally and gender-specific identity stories in that they may create a 
new shade of universalism that contains its own inevitable exclusions. 
In the task of ~ethinking a more flexible theory of identity, let us turn to 
narrative as it has been reframed in current scholarship. 
Reframing narrativity 
To consolidate a cohesive self-identity and collective project every 
knowledge discipline needs an "epistemological other. "28 For the social 
sciences, the concept of narrative - with its long association with the 
humanities profession - holds pride of place in filling that role. Various- 
ly formulated in binary terms as idiographic versus nomothetic, particu- 
laristic versus generalizable, or description versus theory, the contrast 
between the "mere narrative" approach of the historians and the more 
rigorous methodologies of the social sciences has effectively cordoned 
off narrative from legitimate social-science epistemology. 29 But a small 
revolution with potentially large consequences is occurring in our con- 
temporary knowledge culture. 3° Over the last few decades many histor 
rians have lost, abandoned, and even scorned narrative explanation. 31 
At the same time, moreover, a protean refraining of the narrative con- 
cept is seeping or being appropriated into the epistemological frame- 
works of a spectrum of other disciplines - including medicine, social 
psychology, anthropology, gender studies, law, biology, and physics. 
The expressions of this narrative reframing are broad and diverse. One 
aspect of many of the new works in narrative studies, however, is es- 
pecially relevant to the increasing sociological attention to identity for- 
mation. This is the shift from a focus on representational to ontological 
narrativity. Before this shift, philosophers of history had argued that 
narrative modes of representing knowledge (telling historical stories) 
were representational forms imposed by historians on the chaos of 
lived experience. 32 Recently, however, scholars are postulating some- 
thing much more substantive about narrative: namely, that social life is 
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itself storied and that narrative is an ontological condition of social life. 
Their research is showing us that stories guide action; that people con- 
struct identities (however multiple and changing) by locating them- 
selves or being located within a repertoire of emplotted stories; that 
"experience" is constituted through narratives; that people make sense 
of what has happened and is happening to them by attempting to 
assemble or in some way to integrate these happenings within one or 
more narratives; and that people are guided to act in certain ways, and 
not others, on the basis of the projections, expectations, and memories 
derived from a multiplicity but ultimately limited repertoire of available 
social, public, and cultural narratives. 33 
But there is a paradox. On the one hand, social scientists have by and 
large kept their distance from these approaches to narrativity. 34 Yet, on 
the other hand, sociology has long shown an interest in theorizing 
about the very themes addressed in studies of identity formation - the 
study of meaning, social action, social agency, and most recently, col- 
lective identity. Indeed, the last two decades have been notable for the 
number of heroic efforts by sociologists to recast social analysis along 
the central axes of the interaction between agency and structure, that 
is, to develop a social theory that allows for human action that is none- 
theless bounded and constrained by structural restraints. 35 
There are two reasons for this paradoxical distancing from the new nar- 
rative studies on the part of social scientists. The first is that social 
scientists overwhelmingly limit their conception of the term "narrative" 
to that of a representational form/method of presenting social and his- 
torical knowledge. And it is through this methodological debate over 
what counts as valid explanation that social scientists have most force- 
fully separated themselves from the humanities. As long as this repre- 
sentational definition prevails, then, social scientists - in order to be 
social scientists - must continue to view narrative as the epistemologi- 
cal other and in symbolic contrast to causal explanation. Indeed to the 
extent sociologists have engaged with narrative studies, the dialogue 
often recreates the familiar Manichean dichotomy between social- 
science explanation and the narrative other. Whether in favor or dis- 
paragement, the encounters between sociology and narrative analysis 
seem inevitably to result in counterposing narrative to causality. Steven 
Seidman, for example, recently criticized the "foundational obsession- 
alism" of mainstream sociological theory while demonstrating his sup- 
port for an understanding of social theory as "narrative with a moral 
intent. ''36 Seidman is a sociologist who strongly endorses the turn to 
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narrative. Nonetheless, in his association of narrative with "story-telling 
particularism;' he straps it into an unnecessary opposition to, and ulti- 
mately distancing from, the social sciences. 37 Linking identity and action 
research to narrative analysis directs our attention to the new ontological 
dimension of narrative studies and away from the traditional rendering 
of narrative as a method or form of representation. 
The second reason for the neglect of the recently refrained narrativism 
follows directly from the self-identity project of the social sciences. The 
study of identity formation touches on the area of onto logy  - a theory 
of being  - and this. is altogether different from general social science 
approaches to agency and action. From their inception, the social 
sciences have been concerned with what one political scientist calls the 
"primacy of epistemology;'38 or the eclipsing of discovery and ontology 
by the context of justification. 39 The latter comprises the standards we 
use to know about the world, the grounds we rely upon to legitimate 
these foundations of knowledge, the validity of competing methodol- 
ogies, and the criteria for viable explanations. Discovery and ontology, 
on the other hand, refer to problem-formation and social being respec- 
tively. Both are seen as better left to speculative philosophers or psy- 
chologists. The consequences of this division of labor for a sociology of 
action are significant: 1) issues of social being, identity, and ontology 
are excluded from the legitimate mainstream of sociological investiga- 
tion, and 2) the social sciences focus their research on action and agen- 
cy by studying primarily observable social behavior - measured vari- 
ously by social interests, rational preferences, or social norms and 
values - rather than by exploring expressions of social being and iden- 
tity. Therefore, precisely to the extent that sociologists are aware that 
the recent focus of narrative studies is toward issues of identity and 
ontology, these same studies are defined as beyond and outside the 
boundaries of appropriate social-science concern. 4° 
I argue in this article that the association of identity and ontology with 
philosophy or theoretical psychology on the one side, and action with 
interests, norms, or behavior on the other, is a limited model and de- 
prives social scientists of the deeper analysis that it is possible to 
achieve by linking the concepts of action and identity. To get these 
benefits, however, we must reject the decoupling of action from ontol- 
ogy, and instead accept that some notion of social being and social 
identity is, willy-nilly, incorporated into each and every knowledge- 
statement about action, agency, and behavior. Just as sociologists are 
not likely to make sense of action without focusing attention on struc- 
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ture and order, it is unlikely we can interpret social action if we fail to 
also emphasize ontology, social being, and identity. 41 We thus enlarge 
our analytical focus when we study social action through a lens that also 
allows a focus on social ontology and the social constitution of iden- 
tity. 42 The refraining of narrative allows us to make that enlargement. 
From diverse sources it is possible to identify four features of a re- 
framed narrativity particularly relevant for the social sciences: 1) rela- 
fionality of parts, 2) causal emplotment, 3) selective appropriation, and 
4) temporality, sequence, and place. 43 Together, these dimensions sug- 
gest narratives are constellations of relationships (connected parts) 
embedded in time and space, constituted by causal emplotment. Unlike 
the attempt to produce meaning by placing an event in a specified cate- 
gory, narrativity precludes sense-making of a singular isolated phenom- 
enon. Narrafivity demands that we discern the meaning of any single 
event only in temporal and spatial relationship to other events. Indeed, 
the chief characteristic of narrative is that it renders understanding only 
by connecting (however unstably) parts to a constructed configuration 
or a social network of relationships (however incoherent or unrealiz- 
able) composed of symbolic, institutional, and material practices. 44 
The connectivity of parts is precisely why narrativity turns "events" into 
episodes, whether the sequence of episodes is presented or experienced 
in anything resembling chronological order. This is done through 
"emplotment." It is emplotment that gives significance to independent 
instances, not their chronological or categorical order. And it is 
emplotment that translates events into episodes. As a mode of explana- 
tion, causal emplotment is an accounting (however fantastic or implicit) 
of why a narrative has the story line it does. 45 Causal emplotment 
allows us to test a series of "plot hypotheses" against actual events, 
and then to examine how - and under what conditions - the events 
intersect with the hypothesized plot. 46 Without emplotment, events or 
experiences could be categorized only according to a taxonomical 
scheme. Yet, we do not act on the basis of categories or attributes. 
Polkinghorne implicitly addresses the difference between emplotment 
and categorization when he notes that social actions should not be 
viewed as a result of categorizing oneself ("I am 40 years old; I should 
buy life insurance") but should be seen to emerge in the context of a 
life-story with episodes ("I felt out of breath last week, I really should 
start thinking about life insurance"). 47 Similarly, it is also apparent that 
serious mental confusion or political emotion rarely stems from the 
inability to place an event or instance in the proper category. Rather we 
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tend to become confused when it is impossible or illogical to integrate 
an event into an intelligible plot. 48 To make something understandable 
in the context of a narrative is to give it historicity and relationality. This 
works for us because when events are located in a temporal (however 
fleeting) and sequential plot we can then explain their relationship to 
other events. Plot can thus be seen as the logic or syntax of narrative. 49 
The significance of emplotment for narrative understanding is often the 
most misunderstood aspect of narrativity. Without attention to emplot- 
ment, narrativity can be misperceived as a non-theoretical representa- 
tion of events. Yet it is emplotment that permits us to distinguish 
between narrative on the one hand, and chronicle or annales, on the 
other, s° In fact, it is emplotment that allows us to construct a significant 
network or configuration of relationships. 
Another crucial element of narrativity is its evaluative criteria. 51 
Evaluation enables us to make qualitative and lexical distinctions 
among the infinite variety of events, experiences, characters, institu- 
tional promises, and social factors that impinge on our lives. Charles 
Taylor, for example, argues that the capacity to act depends to a great 
extent on having an evaluative framework shaped by what he calls 
"hypergoods" (a set of fundamental principles and values), s2 The same 
discriminatory principle is true of narrative: in the face of a potentially 
limitless array of social experiences deriving from social contact with 
events, institutions, and people, the evaluative capacity of emplotment 
demands and enables selective appropriation in constructing narra- 
tives. 53 A plot must be thematic. 54 The primacy of this narrative theme 
or competing themes determines how events are processed and what 
criteria will be used to prioritize events and render meaning to them. 
Themes such as "husbands as breadwinners," "union solidarity," or 
"women must be independent above all" will selectively appropriate 
the happenings of the social world, arrange them in some order, and 
normatively evaluate these arrangements. 5s 
Four dimensions of  narrativity 
These relatively abstract formulations of narrativity can now be ex- 
pressed as four different dimensions of narrative - ontological, public, 
conceptual, and metanarrativities. 
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Ontological narratives. These are the stories that social actors use to 
make sense of - indeed, to act in - their lives. Ontological narratives 
are used to define who we are; this in turn can be a precondition for 
knowing what to do. s6 This "doing" will in turn produce new narratives 
and hence, new actions; the relationship between narrative and on- 
tology is processual and mutually constitutive. Both are conditions of 
the other; neither are a priori. Narrative location endows social actors 
with identifies - however multiple, ambiguous, ephemeral, or conflict- 
ing they may be (hence the term narrative identity). To have some sense 
of social being in the world requires that lives be more than different 
series of isolated events or combined variables and attributes. Onto- 
logical narratives process events into episodes. People act, or do not 
act, in part according to how they understand their place in any number 
of given narratives - however fragmented, contradictory, or partial. 
Charles Taylor puts it this way: "because we cannot but orient ourselves 
to the good, and thus determine our place relative to it..., we must 
inescapably understand our lives in narrative form....-57 
But ontological narrativity, like the self, is neither a priori nor fixed. 
Ontological narratives make identity and the self something that one 
becomes, s8 Thus narrative embeds identities in time and spatial rela- 
tionships. Ontological narratives affect activities, consciousness, and 
beliefs and are, in turn, affected by them. s9 Like all narratives, ontologi- 
cal narratives are structured by emplotment, relationality, connectivity, 
and selective appropriation. So basic to agency is ontological narrativi- 
ty that if we want to explain - that is, to know, to make sense of, to 
account for, perhaps even to predict, anything about the practices of 
social and historical actors, their collective actions, their modes and 
meanings of institution-building and group-formations, and their ap- 
parent incoherencies - we must first recognize the place of ontological 
narratives in social life. 
But where do ontological narratives come from? How are people's 
stories constructed? Ontological narratives are, above all, social and 
interpersonal. Although psychologists are typically biased toward the 
individual sources of narrative, even they recognize the degree to which 
ontological narratives can only exist interpersonally in the course of  
social and structural interactions over time. 6° To be sure, agents adjust 
stories to fit their own identities, and, conversely, they will tailor "reali- 
ty" to fit their stories. The intersubjective webs of relationality sustain 
and transform narratives over time. Charles Taylor calls these "webs of 
interlocution," others call them "traditions," I call them "public narra- 
tives? '6~ 
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Public Narratives. Public narratives are those narratives attached to cul- 
tural and institutional formations larger than the single individual, to 
intersubjective networks or institutions, however local or grand, micro- 
or macro-stories about American social mobility, the "freeborn 
Englishman," the working-class hero, and so on. Public narratives 
range from the narratives of one's family, to those of the workplace 
(organizational myths), church, government, and nation. 62 Like all nar- 
ratives, these stories have drama, plot, explanation, and selective cri- 
teria. Families, for example, selectively appropriate events to construct 
stories about their descent into poverty. The mainstream media arrange 
and connect events to create a "mainstream plot" about the origin of 
social disorders. The seventeenth-century church explains the theologi- 
cal reasons for a national famine. Government agencies tell us "expert" 
stories about unemployment. Taylor emphasizes the centrality of 
public to ontological narrative when he states: 
We may sharply shift the balance in our definition of identity, dethrone the 
given, historical community as a pole of identity, and relate only to the com- 
munity defined by adherence to the good (or the saved, or the true believers, 
or the wise). But this doesn't sever our dependence on webs of interlocution. 
It only changes the webs, and the nature of our dependence. 63 
Metanarrativity. This third dimension of narrativity refers to the 
"masternarratives" in which we are embedded as contemporary actors 
in history and as social scientists. 64 Our sociological theories and con- 
cepts are encoded with aspects of these master narratives - Progress, 
Decadence, Industrialization, Enlightenment, etc. - even though they 
usually operate at a presuppositional level of social-science epistemol- 
ogy or beyond our awareness. These narratives can be the epic dramas 
of our time: Capitalism vs. Communism, the Individual vs. Society, Bar- 
barism/Nature vs. Civility. They may also be progressive narrativ6s of 
teleological unfolding: Marxism and the triumph of Class Struggle, 
Liberalism and the triumph of Liberty, the Emergence of Western Citi- 
zenship, the Rise of Nationalism or of Islam. The master narrative of 
Industrialization/Modernization out of Feudalism/Traditional Society 
is one of the most outstanding examples of how a metanarrative be- 
comes lodged in the theoretical core of social theory. 
Perhaps the most paradoxical aspect of metanarratives is their quality 
of denarrativization. That is, they are built on concepts and explanatory 
schemes ("social systems;' "social entities;' "social forces") that are in 
themselves abstractions. Although metanarratives have all the neces- 
sary components of narrativity - transformation, major plot lines and 
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causal emplotment, characters and action - they nonetheless miss the 
crucial element of a conceptual narrativity. 65 
Conceptual narrativity. These are the concepts and explanations that we 
construct as social researchers. Because neither social action nor insti- 
tution-building is solely produced through ontological and public nar- 
ratives, our concepts and explanations must include the factors we call 
social forces - market patterns, institutional practices, organizational 
constraints. The challenge of conceptual narrativity is to devise a vo- 
cabulary that we can use to reconstruct and plot over time and space 
the ontological narratives and relationships of historical actors, the 
public and cultural narratives that inform their lives, and the crucial 
intersection of these narratives with the other relevant social fo rces .  66 
To date, few if any of our analytic categories are in themselves temporal 
and spatial. 67 Rather, our modern sociological use of terms such as 
"society;' the "actor," and "culture" is for social-science purposes inten- 
tionally abstracted from their historicity and relationality. The con- 
ceptual challenge that narrativity poses is to develop a social analytic 
vocabulary that can accommodate the contention that social life, social 
organizations, social action, and social identities are narratively, that is, 
temporally and relationally, constructed through both ontological and 
public narratives. 68 
The conceptual implications of the new narrative 
So far, I have elaborated some of the dimensions of narrative analysis 
and have identified the major types of narrativity. What, then, are the 
implications of this conception of narrative for identity formation and 
social theory? How can narrativity help us understand social life and 
social practices? Although all four kinds of narrativity are relevant to 
social theory, it is the fourth that is the most important if theories are 
adequately to account for social action and collective projects. This is 
because conceptual narrativity is defined by temporality, spatiality, and 
emplotment, as well as relationality and historicity. If narrative is indeed 
a constitutive feature of social life, the first analytic challenge is to 
develop concepts that will allow us to capture the narrativity through 
which agency is negotiated, identities are constructed, and social action 
mediated. 69 In the next section I suggest two central components of 
conceptual narrativity: narrative identity and relational setting. 
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Narrative identity 
The concept of a narrative identitydovetails with the move of identity- 
politics to reintroduce previously excluded subjects and suppressed 
subjectivities into theories of action. At the same time, however, the 
narrative identity approach firmly rejects the tendencies of identity 
theories to normatize new categories that are themselves as fixed and 
removed from history as their classical predecessors. The approach 
builds from the premise that narrafivity and relationality are conditions 
of social being, social consciousness, social action, institutions, struc- 
tures, even society itself; the self and the purposes of self are con- 
structed and reconstructed in the context of internal and external rela- 
tions of time and place and power that are constantly in flux. That 
social identities are constituted through narrativity, social action is 
guided by narrativity, and social processes and interactions - both 
institutional and interpersonal - are narratively mediated provides a 
way of understanding the recursive presence of particular identities 
that are, nonetheless, not universal. 
The importance of conceptual narrativity is therefore that it allows us 
to build upon the advances and simultaneously to transcend the fixity 
of the identity concept as it is often used in current approaches to 
social agency. Joining narrative to identity reintroduces time, space, 
and analytical relationality - each of which is excluded from the cate- 
gorical or essentialist approach to identity. While a social identity or 
categorical approach presumes internally stable concepts, such that 
under normal conditions entities within that category will act uniformly 
and predictably, the narrative identity approach embeds the actor 
within relationships and stories that shift over time and space. It thus 
precludes categorical stability in action. These temporally and spatially 
shifting configurations form the relational coordinates of ontological, 
public, and cultural narratives. Within these temporal and multi- 
layered narratives identities are formed; hence narrative identity is pro- 
cessual and relational. In this sense, the narrative identity approach 
shares much with the relational epistemologies most associated with 
Harrison White. 7° 
The analytic relationality of the narrative identity concept is also at 
odds with the normative relationality of theories of identity-politics. 
Feminist identity-politics, for example, see relationality as a normative 
and concrete ontology. First it is argued that women are socialized to 
be more relational than men. Then a normative leap is made to argue 
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that this quality of "being-in-relations" in turn makes women more 
"caring" and more humane. In the narrative identity perspective, by 
contrast, retationality is used only analytically - that is, all identities 
(male and female) must be analyzed in the context of relational and cul- 
tural matrices because they do not "exist" outside of those complexes. 71 
Individualism, after all, is itself socially and relafionally constructed. At 
the same time, this analytic relationality tells us nothing in advance 
about the value or quality of those relationships and relational identi- 
ties. The meaningful implications of a narrative concept of identity can 
only be determined by empirical inquiry, not by a priori assumptions. 
In other words, to say that identities are forged only in the context of 
ongoing relationships that exist in time, space, and emplotment, is not 
to say that "being-in-relationship" is somehow "better" or "worse" than 
the individuafing notions of agency. It is, rather, to divest conceptual 
narrativity of any particular normative implications. The interdepend- 
ence and connectivity of parts characteristic of narrative analysis 
makes relationality an analytic variable instead of an ideal type or 
normative stand-in for an unchanging sense of "community." Relation- 
ships may be more or less bonded, the experience of them may be more 
or less constricting or enabling - but again, this is a question of narra- 
tive contingency, not utopian ideals. 72 
A compelling illustration of the narrative identity concept can be found 
in Steedman's widely-read sociological autobiography of her English 
working-class childhood in the 1950s. 73 According to the dominant 
scholarly accounts, the extreme poverty of mid-century English 
working-class life was compensated by a robust "independence, pri~le, 
and sense of comrnunity. "74 Sociologists have long assumed that 
working-class experience did in fact conform to this depiction of 
working-class identity. Steedman's narrative shatters all of our assump- 
tions about the attributes of identity and agency that should normally 
fit with this form of social categorization of working-class life. She pre- 
sents us, instead, with an aching picture of the "class longings;' and nar- 
ratives of envy and desire (that life might be different), that character- 
ized her life of underprivileged exclusion from the dominant culture. 
Steedman's representations of identities constructed of emotional and 
material poverty unfold sociologically in the context of the relational 
complexity in which her life was embedded, and in the narratives she 
inherited from her mother's life - ones in which gender intersected with 
class and so transformed the usual traits attributed to both of those 
categorical identities] s 
623 
The narrative contingency of identity is similarly vividly suggested in 
Davis's historical sociology of the notorious "one-drop rule" in racial 
classification. 76 Davis's study demonstrates the numerous conflicts that 
accompanied the rule of a type of racial classification that failed to take 
into account the historical intermingling of different races. By declaring 
that anyone with even a drop of African blood was a "Negro," the bur- 
den of proving one's identity - for blacks and whites - makes it obvious 
that such a binary classification is too rigid to account for those whose 
lives failed to conform to the dominant public accounts of racial purity 
and segregation. The irony was that the very people or groups who 
deliberately created racial classifications in the first place often could 
not even identify correctly those individuals they wanted to classify; 
obviously skin color was now a poor indicator of race. The impact of 
America's imaginative one drop rule went beyond public and private 
struggles over personal identity. By compelling all children of mixed 
blood to live in the black con~nunity, "the rule made possible the in- 
credible myth among whites that miscegenation had not occurred, that 
the races had been kept pure in the south.  ''77 The problem of who gets 
to define a person continues even today. One of the key decisions many 
principal investigators make about research projects concerning race is 
whether their interviewers should identify the race of respondents or 
whether the persons being interviewed should get to choose their race 
from a preselected category. 
Class-formation theory provides another example of the concept of 
narrative identity for theoretical rethinking. 78 Class-formation theory 
has traditionally explained action with the concept of interest or with 
universal rational preferences. Since interest is determined by the logic 
and stages of socioeconomic development, the social analyst imputes a 
set of predefined interests or values to people as members of social 
categories (e.g., traditional artisan, modern-factory worker, peasant). 
Historians commonly argue, for instance, that the decline of traditional. 
domestic modes of production and its concomitant threat to custom 
created an "artisanal interest" from which explanations for social move- 
ments can at least in part be derived. Although social science historians 
almost always demonstrate with subtlety how these interests are medi- 
ated through intervening factors (culture, gender, religion, residential 
patterns, etc.), the interests remain the foundational explanation for 
working-class practices and protests. Making sense of social action 
thus becomes an exercise in placing people into the right social cate- 
gories by identifying their putative interests, and then doing the empiri- 
cal work of looking at variations among those interests. 
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T. H. Marshall, for example, in his classic study of citizenship, corre- 
lated the stages of citizenship's development with epochs of class for- 
marion; each state represented the expression of the interests of an 
emerging historic class. 79 Underpinning his argument is the assumption 
that actors within the same category ("the working-class" "the gentry," 
"capitalist employers" "state bureaucrats") will have shared attributes - 
hence shared interests directing them to have similar citizenship prac- 
tices. Naturally, this assumption leads us to expect intra-class uniform- 
ity throughout each period of citizenship-formation: All the members 
of a single category of actors - the eighteenth-century English 
"working class" for example - should behave similarly and have the 
same interests with respect to citizenship regardless of differences of 
residence, family, or gender. 
But why do we premise or limit our understanding of people to their 
work category? Why should we assume that an individual or a collec- 
tivity has a particular set of interests simply because one aspect of their 
identity fits into one social category - in this case their place in the pro- 
duction process? To let "class" stand as a proxy for experience is to 
presume what has not been empirically demonstrated - namely that 
identities are foundationally constituted by their categorization in the 
division of labor. 
Substituting the concept of narrative identity for that of interest cir- 
cumvents this problem. A narrative identity approach assumes that 
social action can only be intelligible if we recognize that people are 
guided to act by the structural and cultural relationships in which they 
are embedded and by the stories through which they constitute their 
identities - and less because of the interests we impute to them. Where- 
as interest derives from how we as analysts categorize people's role in a 
division of labor, the narrative-identity approach emphasizes how we 
characterize or locate people within a processual and sequential move- 
ment of relationships and life-episodes. Whereas an interest approach 
assumes people act on the basis of rational means-ends preferences or 
by internalizing a set of values, a narrative identity approach assumes 
people act in particular ways because not to do so would funda- 
mentally violate their sense of being at that particular time and place, a° 
In another rime or place, or in the context of a different set of prevail- 
ing narratives, that sense of being could be entirely different because 
narrative identities are constituted and reconstituted in time and over 
time. Calhoun demonstrates this in his narrative about how Chinese 
students, who had initially displayed no interest in politics, formed 
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cohesive political identities during the one month they were thrust into 
the overpowering drama of Tienanmen Square. 81 
The "narrative" dimension of identity there and elsewhere, thus pre- 
sumes that action can only be intelligible if we recognize the various 
ontological and public narratives in which actors are emplotted. Narra- 
tive identities are constituted by a person's temporally and spatially 
variable place in culturally constructed stories composed of (break- 
able) rules, (variable) practices, binding (and unbinding) institutions, 
and the multiple plots of family, nation, or economic life. Most impor- 
tant, however, narratives are not incorporated into the self in any direct 
way; rather they are mediated through the enormous spectrum of social 
and political institutions and practices that constitute our so.cial world. 
People's experiences as worke~rs, for example, are inextricably inter- 
connected with the larger matrix of relations that shaped their lives - 
their regional location, the practical workings of the legal system, fami- 
ly patterns - as well as the particular stories (of honor, of ethnicity, of 
gender, of local community, of greed, etc.) used to account for the 
events happening to them. s2 
Relational setting 
Another challenge of conceptual narrativity is to develop a vocaculary 
that will allow us to locate actors' social narratives in temporal and spa- 
tial configurations of relationships and cultural practices (institutions 
and discourses). We need concepts that will enable us to plot over time 
and space the ontological narratives of historical actors, the public and 
cultural narratives that inform their lives, as well as the relevant range 
of other social forces - from politics to demographics - that configure 
together to shape history and social action. We thus need a conceptual 
vocabulary that can relate narrative identity to that range of factors we 
call social forces - market patterns, institutional practices, organiza- 
tional constraints, and so on. 
Society is the term that usually performs this work of contextualization 
in social analysis. When we speak of understanding social action, we 
simultaneously speak of locating the actors in their "societal" context. 
But society as a concept is rooted in a falsely totalizing and naturalistic 
way of thinking about the world. For most practicing social-science 
research, a society is a social entity. As an entity, it has a core essence - 
an essential set of social springs at the heart of the mechanism. This 
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essential core is in turn reflected in broader co-varying societal institu- 
tions that the system comprises. Thus, when sociologists speak of 
feudalism, for example, we mean at once 'geudal society" as a whole, a 
particular set of "feudal class relations" at the core of this society, a 
'geudal manorial economy," and a concomitant set of "feudal institu- 
tions" such as feudal political units and feudal peasant communities. 
Most significantly for historical research, institutions within a society 
must co-vary with each other. Thus in '~feudal societies," the state by 
definition must be a feudal state whose feudal character co-varies with 
all other feudal institutions; feudal workers must all be unfree and 
extra-economically exploited peasants. And in "industrial society," a 
"modern industrial/capitalist" state must be detached from civil society 
and the industrial economy, and industrial workers must be individual 
and legally free. To be sure, the synchrony is not always perfect. In 
periods ,of transition from one society to another, there occurs a "lag 
effect" and remnants of the old order persist against the pressures of 
the new. But despite these qualifications, the systemic metaphor as- 
sumes that the parts of society co-vary along with the whole as a cor- 
porate entity. 
To make social action intelligible and coherent, these systemic typolo- 
gies must be broken apart and their parts disaggregated and reassem- 
bled on the basis of relational clusters. For a social order is neither a 
naturalistic system nor a plurality of individuals, but rather a complex 
of contingent cultural and institutional relationships. If we want to be 
able to capture the narrativity of social life we need a way of thinking 
that can substitute a relational imagery for a totalizing one. I thus agree 
with Tilly and White who both concur in their own way with Michael 
Mann who writes: "It may seem an odd position for a sociologist to 
adopt; but if I could, I would abolish the concept of "society" alto- 
gether." 83 Substituting the metaphor of a relational setting for "society" 
makes this possibleP 4 A relational setting is a pattern of relationships 
among institutions, public narratives, and social practices. As such it is 
a relational matrix, a social network. 85 Identity-formation takes shape 
within these relational settings of contested but patterned relations 
among narratives, people, and institutions. 
One of the most important characteristics of a relational setting is that 
it has a history, and thus must be explored over time and space. 86 A 
relational setting is traced over time not by looking for indicators of 
social development, but by empirically examining if and when relation- 
al interactions among narratives and institutions appear to have pro- 
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duced a decisively different outcome from previous ones. Social 
change, from this perspective, is viewed not as the evolution or revolu- 
tion of one societal type to another, but by shifting relationships among 
the institutional arrangements and cultural practices that constitute one 
or more social settings. 
Spatially, a relational setting must be conceived with a geometric rather 
than a mechanistic metaphor, because it is composed of a matrix of 
institutions linked to each other in variable patterns contingent on the 
interaction of all points in the matrix. A setting crosses "levels" of 
analysis and brings together in one setting the effect of, say, the inter- 
national market, the state's war-making policies, the local political con- 
flicts among elites, and the community's demographic practices of a 
community - each of which takes social, geographical, and symbolic 
narrative expression. This cross-cutting character of a relational setting 
assumes that the effect of any one level (for example, the labor-market 
sector) can only be discerned by assessing how it is affected interactive- 
ly by the other relevant dimensions, such as gender and race. To do 
so requires that we first disaggregate the parts of a setting from any pre- 
sumed covarying whole and then reconfigure them in their temporal 
and geographic relationality. In this way, for example, different regions 
of a single nation-state are no longer cast as variants of a single society, 
but as different relational settings that can be compared, s7 
Conceptual narrativity and theories of action and agency 
Narrative identity and social meaning 
One major advantage of the concept of narrative identity is in the chal- 
lenge it poses to the false dichotomy too often posed between ideal 
versus instrumental meanings of action. 8a Some sociologists claim that 
action is only authentic when it is expressive rather than instrumental. 
To enforce the point, material goals - such as bread and wages - are 
typically called instrumental while ideal activities are usually associated 
with qualitative concerns in daily life. Weber, for instance, argued that if 
wages were of secondary importance for German workers, that was 
evidence of the superiority of ideal action) 9 From the same assump- 
tions, neo-classical economists go to equal lengths to provide support 
for the primacy of self-interest among workers in order to support the 
concept of rational action. And most currently, it is theorists of the new 
identity-politics who distinguish the new social movements (from the 
old) by their putatively exclusively ideal - hence, identity - focus. 9° 
628 
Yet from a narrative identity perspective there is nothing self-evident 
about the instrumental nature of wage demands any more than that of 
the ideal nature usually attributed to cultural activities. When we look 
at wage-struggles, for instance, as part of an a priori system of categori- 
zation, we inevitably classify them as expressions of instrumental goals. 
But when we view these same wage-struggles through the lens of a nar- 
rative identity analysis, we are immediately impressed by the difficulty 
of classifying them as solely either instrumental or ideal. Wages served 
every purpose from maintaining social honor, to preserving families, to 
asserting independence in the face of newly imposed factory regimes. 
Historical studies demonstrate the vast range of variation in the use of 
bread and wages. Indeed, if there is any common narrative theme that 
emerges from these studies, it is that wage-struggles appear to be most 
commonly viewed as a form of provisioning - a characteristic social 
activity that defies either ideal or instrumental classification in its focus 
on maintaining relational continuities over t ime and within space. 91 
Many examples defy attempts to periodize or categorize instrumental 
(material) versus ideal (identity) ends. Joyce, for example, has collected 
an array of studies illustrating the remarkable variation in "the histori- 
cal meanings of w o r k ,  ''92 It is not just that work signified honor as much 
as livelihood; equally important, even when money wages were at stake, 
it was impossible to separate their narrative value from that of the "dig- 
nity of the trade. ''93 Many years ago Smelser demonstrated that collec- 
tive movements aimed at factory reform (surely the quintessential 
"instrumental" object) were motivated by working families' efforts to 
hold the family together against the destabilizing impact of women and 
children's factory labor. 94 And when nineteenth-century working 
people demanded the vote on the grounds of their "property in labor," 
it was not the autonomous workmanship ideal of Locke on which they 
founded these claims, but on the relational property of apprenticeship 
- a form of judicial citizenship and community solidarity. 95 
The meaning imputed to the appropriation of material life should not, 
therefore, be presumed until historically explored. Just as an adequate 
material life is an essential means of preserving normative relations, so 
cultural and symbolic relations provide material resources for liveli- 
hood. 96 Similarly, so-called instrumental strategies and identity politics 
appear to be increasingly linked in research findings about the new 
social movements. 97 
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The narrative identity concept allows us to make this shift in the inter- 
pretation of action from an a priori categorization to a focus on con- 
tingent narratives of meaning. The example of the conceptual shift 
from ideal versus instrumental agency to the concept of provisioning, 
for example, strikingly supports the switch from fixed notions of agen- 
cy to relational analyses of identity formation. If persons are socially 
constituted over time, space, and through relationality, then others are 
constitutive rather than external to identity. From this perspective 
authentic social action can readily encompass institutional practices 
that organize social inclusions and institutional exclusions - such as 
trade unions or community associations. 98 Historical and contempora- 
ry studies indeed suggest that structural, and sometimes normative, 
autonomy was more often than not contingent upon the grids of social 
relationality (everything from collective memories, to political power 
and policies from above, to competing social claims, to pasts and 
futures of intractable social connections, and public narratives) that 
variably adhere to the interstices of an individual life. 99 These institu, 
tional and symbolic relationships are no mere external set of norms to 
be "stripped away by the sociologist" to discover the "real analytic 
self"; they are not "internalized" sets of societal rules residing within 
the human being. 1°° Rather they are constitutive to self, identity, and 
agency. Consider the comments of one late eighteenth-century English 
artisan on some of the progressive French notions of liberty that 
threatened to dismantle regulative welfare policies: 
It cannot be said to be the liberty of a citizen, or of one who fives under the 
protect ion of any community; it is rather the liberty of a savage; therefore he 
who avails himself thereof, deserves not that protection, the power of society 
affords. I0~ 
For this individual, others were not part of the external problem of 
constraint but constitutive - for good or for bad - of his narrative iden- 
tity. 
Race, gender, and power 
Although social action may be only intelligible through the construc- 
tion, enactment, and appropriation of narratives, this does not mean 
that social actors are free to fabricate narratives at will. Rather, there is 
only a limited repertoire of available representations and stories. 
Which kinds of narratives will socially predominate is contested politi- 
cally and will depend in large part on the distribution of power. This is 
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why the kinds of narratives people use to make sense of their situations 
will always be an empirical rather than a presuppositional question. It is 
essential, in other words, that we explicate, rather than assume or take 
for granted, the narratives of groups and persons. The extent and 
nature of any given repertoire of narratives available for appropriation 
is always historically and culturally specific; the particular plots that 
give meanings to those narratives cannot be determined in advance. 
Since social actors do not freely construct their own private or public 
narratives, we can also expect to find that confusion, powerlessness, 
despair, victimization, and even madness are some of the outcomes of 
an inability to accommodate certain happenings within a range of avail- 
able cultural, public, and institutional narratives. Thus, in everyday talk 
we often characterize incoherent experiences - and especially those 
where we feel controlled by a greater power than our own - as "Kafka- 
esque." 102 For this reason, gender studies and critical race theories have 
eagerly argued for the importance of constructing new public narra- 
tives and symbolic representations that do not continue the long tradi- 
tion of exclusion so characteristic of dominant ones. 
Patrizia Violi, for example, reminds us how critical the presence or 
absence of particular kinds of narratives have been to the construction 
of both male and female subjectivities. 1°3 The archetypical "universal" 
narrative allows men to objectivize themselves and their own experi- 
ences in these everyman stories - stories that not only represent male- 
ness, but in effect replicate the metanarratives of classical social theory. 
In pointing out that women do not have available to them the same nor- 
matively valued forms of symbolic representation - especially stories 
of solidarity and autonomy among women - Violi notes the difficulties 
for women in constructing social identities. These representational 
silences are therefore tantamount to keeping invisible not only the dif- 
ferences between men and women but also the very subjectivities of 
women themselves. Seeing representation, narrative, and subjectivity as 
part of the same process, Violi argues that unless female subjectivity is 
made visible through narrative "it will remain confined within the 
closed space of individual experience. ''1°4 Choosing narratives to 
express multiple subjectivities is a deliberate way of rejecting the 
neutrality and appearance of objectivity typically embedded in master 
narratives. 
Steedman's analytic autobiography of her English working-class roots 
is among the most powerful examples of the significance of alternative 
631 
public narratives in countering the potential damage to identity for- 
mation caused by singular dominant narratives. 1°5 The public narra- 
tives of working-class community she had available as a child omitted 
women, just as many of the current feminist accounts of identity omit 
class and poverty. 1°6 In this context of narrative silence toward her own 
experiences, Steedman presents a picture of a self's (her mother's) 
absolute longing and absence. Challenging the silence, Steedman ar- 
ticulates a counter-narrative - one that joins gender and class, with 
many other relational complexities of English life - and thus lays the 
groundwork for a newly reconstructed kind of narrative identity- 
formation. 
Struggles over narrations are thus struggles over identity. In an exami- 
nation of their legal training, for instance, Patricia Williams and 
Charles Lawrence explicitly reject silencing the human voice in order 
to produce "abstract, mechanistic, professional, and rationalist" legal 
discourse. 1°7 Embracing the notion of multiple subjectivity, Williams 
tells us that she does not use the "traditionally legal black-letter 
vocabulary," because she is "intentionally double-voiced and relation- 
al. ''1°8 Lawrence calls this kind of multiple consciousness by another 
name - "dual subjectivity."1°9 Either way, these scholars of color con- 
tend that writing counter-narratives is a crucial strategy when one's 
identity is not expressed in the dominant public ones. It is not sur- 
prising then that the narratives of excluded voices reveal "alternative 
values" since narratives "articulate social realities not seen by those 
who live at ease in a world of privilege." 110 The centrality of ontological 
narrative in the construction of social identities is also revealed in a 
story Williams tells about starting law school at Harvard University. 
With "secretive reassurance," Williams recalls, her mother explained 
why she knew the young black student would succeed at the prestigious 
university. "The Millers were lawyers, so you have it in your blood. ''IlI 
Encoded in that story about the white slave holder (Attorney Austin 
Miller) who had purchased and impregnated Williams' great-great- 
grandmother was the proof that a category is neither fixed nor non- 
relational. If "one drop" of blood could be constructed into a narrative 
to dominate one sector of the population, could the story not also be 
inverted so that now encoded in that single drop of blood is a narrative 
of empowerment? 
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Narrative identity and social class 
Conceptual narrativity also allows us to think differently about the rela- 
tionship between social classes and political action. Recall the earlier 
example from T.H. Marshall in which he assumed a correlation 
between class attributes and political action toward citizenship forma- 
tion. 112 Relational and narrative approaches can be brought to bear on 
the same evidence to show otherwise. Even though eighteenth-century 
English working people certainly shared important attributes - they 
were propertyless in most respects, exploited by their employers, and 
working for wages - their conditions and degrees of empowerment 
with respect to citizenship were not uniform but varied dramatically 
across the social and geographical landscape. The "same" working 
class differed radically as to whether they even perceived the laws of 
citizenship to be rights in the first place. Neither class nor status divi- 
sions can account for these differences since those in similar class 
situations maintained different degrees of power across regions. 
From the narrative identity perspective, these same working classes 
would be seen as members of political cultures whose symbolic and 
relational places in a matrix of narratives and relationships are better 
indicators of action than their categorical classifications. From this 
angle of relational membership, identities cannot be derived from attri- 
butes imputed from a stage of societal development (be it pre-industrial 
or modern), or by "experience" imputed from a social category (such as 
traditional artisan, factory laborer, or working-class wife), but by 
actors' places in the multiple (often competing) symbolic and material 
narratives in which they were embedded or with which they identi- 
fied. 113 We would thus no longer assume that a group of people have 
any particular relationship to citizenship simply because one aspect of 
their identity fits into a single category known as the ~"working class." 
Social action thus loses its categorical stability, and group embedded- 
ness and cultural representations become more important than class 
attributes - thus directing us to investigate citizenship-identities by 
looking at actors' places in their relational settings, or what Bourdieu 
would call a "habitus." 114 As a general proposition, this would direct us 
to expect greater contingencies of agency. We would be considerably 
less concerned with "deviation" and more fascinated by variation. 
This shift would in turn allow us to make sense of a situation in which 
even though a large group of English people could be similarly cate- 
gorized as "working-class" - in that they shared working-class attri- 
633 
butes (lack of ownership of means of production, landlessness, and so 
on) - their political activities and identities varied radically depending 
upon their settings. ~15 In the case of eighteenth-century England the 
effects usually attributed to proletarianization were in fact over- 
determined in many instances by particular narrative relationships and 
institutional practices (including national apprenticeship laws, the par- 
ticipatory rules and expectations of enforcement, the durability of par- 
ticle inheritance, the local control and symbolic meaning attached to 
skilled work, and the skilled practices of affiliation). In a context con- 
figured by these relationships, certain working communities were able 
to offset many of the "normal" consequences of propertylessness with a 
more powerful form of "property" in association and membership. 116 
Conclusion 
Modern social theories of universal agency have made many of the data 
of human activity inexplicable. Until recently, women, non-westerners, 
and minorities frequently were defined in social anlaysis (often inad- 
vertently) as irrational, anomalous, or deviant from modern social 
action. Consider, for example, the "problem" of those nineteenth-cen- 
tury working-class movements that deviated from Marxist predictions 
of revolutionary class consciousness when they demanded state inter- 
vention to protect their rights. All too frequently, these movements 
have been labeled by historians and sociologists as "reformist" or as 
victims of "social control" and "false consciousness." This barely con- 
ceals a hidden contempt for those putatively duped objects of history 
who acted differently from the way the universal modern class actor 
would. Yet as long as we continue to conceptualize others as sources of 
external constraint, we are forced to label such relational and institu- 
tionally-oriented goals as "backwards-looking," "reactionary," or as evi- 
dence of social control. ~ 17 Action and agency that fail to conform to the 
postulates of the universal norms of agency are often explained by the 
external power of order, or internalized institutional constraint - be it 
norms or social laws, bureaucratic power, or economic forces. Why? 
Because the dispossessed ghost-like individual self is "less liberated 
than disempowered. ''118 Indeed, one could go further; such a person 
cannot = even heuristically - exist. If an aim of the social sciences is to 
generate explanations £0r action that are indeed intelligible, the capac- 
ity of social-science logic to lay the basis for achieving that end will 
depend on its epistemological principles and categories being informed 
by time, space, and narrativity. 119 
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Bringing the rich dimensions of ontological narrativity to the new iden- 
tity approaches in social action theory is one way of doing this. The 
concepts of narrative identity and relational setting allow us to recon- 
ceptualize the subject-object dualism of modern social theory. They 
transform the dichotomy into numerous matrices of patterned rela- 
tionships, social practices, and institutions mediated not by abstrac- 
tions but by linkages of political power, social practices, and public nar- 
ratives. This simultaneously reconceptualizes social agency away from 
its unitary status of individuation, and toward an understanding of 
agency constituted within institutions, structures of power, cultural 
networks, and, more generally, those others who are a central analytic 
dimension (again, not necessarily normative) of that identity. These 
conceptualizations are themselves premised on the extensive research, 
across time and space, which already suggests that social identities are 
constituted by the intricate interweaving of history, narrativity, social 
knowledge, and relationality, as well as institutional and cultural prac- 
tices. 
The narrative approach to identity thus addresses the incoherencies 
of theories of action that leave vast numbers of social actors and 
social practices thoroughly unaccounted for - redefined as "marginal," 
"deviant," or "anomalous." It also builds upon the strengths of the 
recent shift in sociologies of action from universal notions of agency to 
more particularistic identities - a shift that endows the previously mar- 
ginalized with a powerful new sense of subjectivity. In recognizing the 
importance of these new sociologies of identity, however, I have also 
tried to call attention to their potential weaknesses - foremost among 
which are the tendencies to conflate analytic or structural relationality 
into normative values about "being-in-relations" (e.g., Chodorow and 
Gilligan), as well as the inadvertent ahistoricism that results from con- 
structing categories of identity. 12° There is, to be sure, an important 
theoretical distinction to be made between two kinds of categories - 
those based on (1) taxonomical categories of identity aggregated from 
variables (age, sex, education, etc.) or "fixed" entities (woman, man, 
black) and, (2) categories that coincide with a narrative thematic. For 
instance, it is not hard to classify certain narratives as falling in the 
category of the "heroic Westerner," or "the virtues of American democ- 
racy." This is a classification, however, of the narrative itself. It can 
still be abstracted from context and its ontological relationality 
kept intact. By contrast, the classification of an actor divorced from 
analytic relationality is neither ontologically intelligible nor meaning- 
ful. In her study of audience responses to western movies, for instance, 
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Shively appropriately must classify by theme the western movies she 
shows her audiences. 121 Yet while these thematic classifications of the 
narratives remain stable throughout the study, her findings reveal that 
audience identification with and response to those themes depends 
less on the racial category of the respondent (native American or 
white) and more on the actors' changing social and historical em- 
beddedness. 
I am not suggesting that there is no place for the use of categories of 
identity in everyday social practice. 122 Brint, for example, rightly says 
that the sociological use of categories reflects the "belief that the ex- 
perience of common conditions of life.., makes people with shared 
attributes a meaningful feature of the social strncture. ''123 But it is pre- 
cisely because this belief is acc~epted into social analysis too uncritically 
that new theories of action centered around identity are often empiri- 
cally confounded. There is no reason to assume a priori that people 
with similar attributes will share common experiences of social life, let 
alone be moved to common forms and meanings of social action, 
unless they share similar narrative identities and relational settings. 
Bringing narrativity to identity thus provides the conceptual sinews 
that produces a tighter, more historically sensitive coupling between 
social identity and agency. 
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